casual discussion of it, so ...

MR. SOKOLOFF: Yeah, I'm not aware of any even

THE COURT: Well, I mean you're one of the people

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usc 2.1	PROCEEDINGS 5
1	who would be having the casual discussion, so if you're not
2	aware of it, I mean
3	Do you think it might be a good idea?
4	MR. SOKOLOFF: I wouldn't say no to a discussion.
5	THE COURT: Okay.
6	And who's our magistrate judge here?
7	THE COURTROOM DEPUTY: Judge Orenstein.
8	THE COURT: Oh, it's Judge Orenstein. Okay.
9	I don't know, I think in a case like this it might
10	not be a bad idea. Surely we're going to go through all of
11	the issues that have been raised, but I think it's worth
12	talking about. Maybe you'll be too far apart, I don't know,
13	but it's something I would consider.
14	Do you have a conference coming up?
15	MR. HARVIS: Well, it was a little weird, but I
16	think we do, and I think it's towards the end of the month,
17	Your Honor, our initial conference.
18	THE COURT: With Judge Orenstein.
19	MR. HARVIS: That's right.
20	THE COURT: Just hold on for a second.
21	(Pause.)
22	THE COURT: Back on the record.
23	All right, so I guess in no particular order, this
24	is a motion to dismiss, which makes me wonder how I could

consider the transcript of the trial on a motion to dismiss.

	PROCEEDINGS 6
1	MR. HARVIS: May I be heard on that, Your Honor?
2	THE COURT: Sure.
3	MR. HARVIS: Thank you so much.
4	So there was a decision from the Second Circuit five
5	days ago in a case called Lynch versus City of New York, and
6	in that Judge Kearse discusses when extrinsic material may be
7	considered, and it has to be it has to be relied upon in
8	the drafting of the complaint, usually it's an exhibit.
9	THE COURT: I don't think that's new law.
10	MR. HARVIS: Right.
11	THE COURT: I think that's the way it's always been.
12	I mean that might be a relevant consideration in a
13	motion for summary judgment, but it also might be I mean,
14	I'm going to suggest that there are some of these claims you
15	might want to amend your complaint on some.
16	MR. HARVIS: Part of our presentation today was
17	going to be to ask for the opportunity to leave to amend.
18	THE COURT: Granted.
19	MR. HARVIS: Thank you very much, Your Honor. I
20	will do that.
21	THE COURT: I just think it's better to cut to the
22	chase on these things rather than litigate it.
23	So let me just suggest a few areas where I'm
24	confused, and that's probably my own fault.
25	It's possible that looking at those minutes might

PROCEEDINGS 1 make you rethink some of this because -- so just beginning 2. with the Monell claims. 3 I take the point about what -- and I'll ask you some 4 questions about this sort of -- I'm trying to do this in some 5 order from malicious prosecution to fair trial -- false arrest 6 and malicious prosecution, but I don't think you can do a 7 respondeat superior claim on a Monell. 8 MR. HARVIS: That's right. 9 THE COURT: Okay. Because in your letter you say 10 you can. 11 MR. HARVIS: No. What we wanted to point out is 12 that we have properly pled respondeat claims, which goes to 1.3 the question of personal involvement under Section 1983. 14 THE COURT: I see. 15 MR. HARVIS: Because those claims don't require a 16 showing of personal involvement, and so it's somewhat academic 17 at this stage to try to figure out exactly who did what. 18 Because at the end of the day, the municipal employers will be 19 responsible for the tortious conduct of their employees, even 20 if we don't identify them specifically. 21 THE COURT: I think I understand that. 22 Do you have anything you want to say about that? 23 MR. SOKOLOFF: Not really.

THE COURT: Okay.

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And maybe this is not necessary to talk about this

MR. HARVIS: That's right, Your Honor.

THE COURT: I see. He felt he was pressured.

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THE COURT: So -- okay. So maybe some of these questions don't matter.

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You know, so one of the lineup claims was that they changed the appearance, and my recollection, it's been a while since I thought about state court lineups, but the recollection is that sometimes the police will put everybody in a particular kind of hat or sit them down so that the suspect doesn't stand out.

But what you're alleging is that they used this practice to hide his features that would show that he couldn't have been the guy.

MR. HARVIS: And even more than that, Your Honor, we have a statement that's in the letter, our second letter, that had his height been disclosed to the eyewitness, he would have immediately said that's not the guy.

THE COURT: But I take it a judge heard all of this in the ${\it Wade}$ hearing.

MR. HARVIS: Yes.

The aspect of the case that relates to the evidence that was presented at trial, is in our view, an extremely narrow little slice of the case.

And we would agree that to the extent those allegations were completely exposed at the trial, it will neither form of the basis of a *Brady* claim nor a due process claim.

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1 THE COURT: Okay. And then another question I had 2 was just about the trial itself. 3 I guess there was alibi notice that was filed, and 4 then it sounds like, although it's not entirely clear to me, 5 it sounds like the prosecutor cross-examined the alibi 6 witnesses. I think the case is called Dawson, some state 7 court case that you can establish four different things. 8 Did the judge sustain or overrule objections to 9 those questions, and does that matter? 10 MR. HARVIS: That's a very good question. 11 think that, you know, it matters depending on which of the 12 claims we're evaluating. 1.3 And I think the answer is there were objections made 14 on the record, and I think that the court permitted the 15 cross-examination that would -- we would allege it was 16 improper. 17 THE COURT: So when there are objections that are 18 overruled and a judge, like in a summation, is it more the 19 judge's actions that you're complaining about then the --20 well, ultimately you're complaining about the judge's actions. 21 I don't think they do that here. 22 MR. HARVIS: Right. And I just want to be clear. 23 We're not suing any judges or prosecutors here. 24 THE COURT: You can if you want. Well, you can't 25 actually.

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1 I just want to make sure that I'm understanding what 2 the context is. Is it fair to say that these things that 3 you've put in the complaint are just to show that everybody 4 was --5 MR. HARVIS: Well, we're --6 THE COURT: -- the forces were conspiring against 7 him? 8 MR. HARVIS: We're trying to piece together all the 9 strings that created this injustice, including those that are 10 actionable, and those that are just atmospheric. 11 THE COURT: Okay. 12 MR. SOKOLOFF: Judge, if I may. 1.3 THE COURT: I was going to get to you. 14 MR. SOKOLOFF: Oh, okay. 15 THE COURT: I just wanted to make sure I understood 16 some of these claims. I think I'm getting it now. 17 Go ahead. 18 MR. SOKOLOFF: As I see the complaint, these 19 allegations against the prosecutor are not just there for 20 atmospherics, they form the basis of a Monell claim. 21 THE COURT: Well, that's what I thought. 22 MR. SOKOLOFF: Well, that's what I thought, too. 23 THE COURT: I thought -- that's what I was curious about. But I thought the Monell was you're going to show a 24 25 history of prosecutor saying terrible things and Appellate

	PROCEEDINGS 12
1	Court telling them to stop saying it.
2	MR. HARVIS: That's Bellamy. Right, Your Honor.
3	THE COURT: I'm quite familiar with it, yes.
4	Except in Bellamy there were no objections and it
5	was never the it was never the point of an appeal.
6	So I'm just curious about does the judge play any
7	role in ruling on the objections, and whether that's a Monell
8	claim?
9	MR. HARVIS: Well, our Monell claim, as I see it, is
10	not the type of questions that the prosecutor was allowed to
11	ask, but the way he was permitted to characterize the evidence
12	in summation.
13	THE COURT: So we're not talking about the cross.
14	MR. HARVIS: No. Except to the I apologize, Your
15	Honor. Except to the extent that the cross was where the
16	evidence derived that the prosecutor argued.
17	THE COURT: All right. So I haven't seen this
18	transcript, so he makes these arguments that are based on?
19	MR. HARVIS: Probably Dawson. It sounds like it.
20	I'm not a criminal practicer, and I think that he
21	may have had a better Mr. Galloway may have a slightly
22	better lawyer at the criminal trial than Mr. Bellamy. I'm
23	guessing. It sounds like.
24	THE COURT: No, no, actually, no. Therein lies a
25	tale. But that's a totally different kind of case.

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PROCEEDINGS

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But if a judge overrules an objection and then let's the prosecutor make the argument, and I don't know what happened in a case on appeal, but if this case was -- that was the argument that was made on appeal, and the judge and the Appellate Division denied it, I don't if that happened. MR. HARVIS: There was no appeal. The DA came in and exonerated him before the appeal was even filed. THE COURT: Ten years? MR. HARVIS: It was being perfected. What can I tell you. THE COURT: That's something else. All right, so let's just take -- let's say that the judge doesn't agree that these are improper questions. Can that be the basis of a Monell claim? And I'm just wondering if the prosecutors -- if someone's been telling you you're doing a terrible job, you've got to stop this practice, but the judge before whom you're trying the case sends you the message that it's okay, how -- I just -- I don't quite understand how that works. MR. HARVIS: I think it's an interesting argument, and I think it's a little bit, if I may, in the weeds from where we view the sort of real crux of the case. THE COURT: Right. MR. HARVIS: But I would say -- I would say, no, I don't think it's legally significant what a given criminal

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PROCEEDINGS 14 court judge rules. I think we look at it against the constitution. And if the policy is to make improper summation arguments that are violative of the due process clause then that it's irrelevant, in my view, whether a particular judge presiding in a particular trial thinks that's the case or not. THE COURT: Okay. All right, I think I get it. Do you have something you want to say about that? MR. SOKOLOFF: Yes. THE COURT: Just take it easy. Talk. We're just talking. Go ahead. MR. SOKOLOFF: So you can't have a Monell claim unless you have an underlying constitutional violation. First you have to prove that what's done was unconstitutional, and then as Monell, you have to show that it resulted from a policy, practice, custom or procedure of the municipality. Here, the fact that this very issue was argued

before the judge, the judge made a ruling, the judge found that the question was proper.

Under the Wray case, that severs the causation. It's an independent act by an external party between the wrongdoing and the claimed damages.

So in answering your question, the fact that the judge ruled on this, and I believe the judge actually

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PROCEEDINGS 15 referenced the state court case that you mentioned, Dawson, in evaluating this, that -- that cuts the chain and that's the Wray case. THE COURT: Well, I guess -- I'm getting ahead of myself a little bit here. I'm just a little curious about it because I'm always curious of how you try one of these cases in front of the jury and who tells them -- you know, I guess we get some expert to talk about what happens at a trial. But I think it's very -- I wonder what juries think about it. And this doesn't go to your claim at all, but, you know, most juries watch a lot of TV, and they think that people can say whatever they want in summation. And so if some professor gets up there and says you're not allowed to say, I don't know, whatever things you're not allowed to say now, I'm just -- I just don't know what juries do with it. And I wonder how many of these cases have been tried.

MR. HARVIS: Not many, I think.

Can I just say one thing, Your Honor?

THE COURT: Sure.

MR. HARVIS: So the Wray case did not involve a Monell claim, it involved a due process claim. And Wray and Towns, which Wray relies on, were both summary judgment decisions.

1 THE COURT: Right.

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MR. HARVIS: And they both involved cases where there was substantial evidence of guilt aside from the evidence at issue.

Our facts are much more like the *Bermudez* case from 2015, where you also had an admittedly innocent man, and you had the allegation that the evidence as it was presented from the officer to the ADA was — they misled the ADA about the quality of the evidence and that resulted in defective presentation before the grand jury, and then also taint at the trial, which the trial judge knew nothing about.

And so our view is that both procedurally and substantively this case is just very distinguishable from Wray.

THE COURT: Well, obviously when we're talking about the standard for a complaint, I think some of these things are more appropriately discussed in a motion for summary judgment.

The only thing I was going to try to get you to think about was whether you're going to come in second on summary judgment on some of this any way because of this, just in terms of drafting another complaint, if you had these very strong arguments that have come up since the time you drafted your complaint. It's just something to keep in mind.

And, you know, I do always encourage litigants to think about what the jury's going to do with certain claims,

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PROCEEDINGS 17 and they sound so appealing to us lawyers when you get, you know, a regular group of citizens they have no idea what we're talking about. So it's neither here nor there in terms of -- in terms of legal sufficiency. I do just -- and, again, maybe this is a failure of imagination on my part. I think McDonough takes out the time bar claims. McDonough pretty clearly says for a fair trial fabrication of evidence claims that they -- that favorable termination is the point at which the claim -- the time starts running. I don't -- maybe I shouldn't admit this -- I have no idea what you're talking about with the intracorporate conspiracy. I don't think that matters. I think the clear lesson of McDonough, it's usually municipal defendants like is that favorable termination is an element of the fair trial fabricated evidence claim, and that's when the claim starts. So I don't think that that is going to work. Like I

So I don't think that that is going to work. Like I said, maybe it's because I don't know -- I didn't get what was it, the Intracorporate Conspiracy Doctrine?

I just don't think that -- I'm being a little facetious, I get what that is, I just don't know how it -- what it could possibly have to do with favorable termination.

MR. HARVIS: Well, the point that we were making,

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PROCEEDINGS 18 Your Honor, is that we think it's the explicit holding on McDonough that this claim did not accrue until this case was over. But just reaching the actual substantive argument that's normally raised in the 1983 conspiracy context, we just wanted to point out to the Court that we would not be blocked based on that doctrine. That was all. THE COURT: I see. But I do think McDonough is -- I think that time bar is not going to work on this one. MR. SOKOLOFF: It weakens our argument significantly, I grant that. But McDonough didn't deal with a conspiracy claim. THE COURT: I don't think it cared, though. I mean, I think most of the courts that have considered the favorable termination in this district have said -- have read it, I think to the dismay of some on the plaintiff's side, as saying that it's an element -- it's always been an element of a malicious prosecution claim.

And just as the decisions that I've read, I think there might be one exception, but most district courts in our district and in the Southern District are saying favorable termination, regardless of the charge, is an element of a fair trial claim.

And maybe the Circuit will straighten one of us out on this, so...

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1 MR. HARVIS: As an aside, Your Honor. I had the 2 privilege of going to watch the argument in the Supreme Court 3 on McDonough. It was awesome. 4 And I just want to point Your Honor to footnote 10 5 of the opinion which says that: Perhaps a more capacious 6 understanding of favorable termination is appropriate in the 7 fair trial context. 8 That's the only point I wanted to make. 9 THE COURT: I saw that. But any way... 10 MR. HARVIS: I agree with Your Honor, though. 11 THE COURT: I don't think it's a bar. I mean, it's 12 quite clear that that's a deadline at the time it's favorably 1.3 terminated. So I mean I think -- I'm just trying to think is 14 15 there anything else in terms -- because I am going to permit 16 you to amend your complaint, because I think it's a good idea. 17 I think you say that you're not going to sue those 18 retired cops in their official capacity. 19 MR. HARVIS: That's right. We'll fix that, Your 20 Honor. 21 THE COURT: All right. And then --22 MR. HARVIS: And we'll take a close look at the 23 Monell claim. 24 THE COURT: Take a look at it and see what you 25 think.

1	I just want to make sure I understand that the
2	we've got the witness I understood you to be saying in your
3	complaint that the defendants misled the grand jury.
4	MR. HARVIS: Correct.
5	THE COURT: Okay. Not the but you were looking
6	at the <i>Monell</i> claim anyway, so okay.
7	I think that's what we'll do. So how much time do
8	you need to file an amended complaint?
9	MR. HARVIS: We're I'm supposed to be flying
10	tomorrow, but I'm like so on the fence about it, and she's
11	supposed to be flying the following week, and so I don't think
12	either of those things are going to happen.
13	THE COURT: I'll give you some extra time.
14	MR. HARVIS: How about three weeks, Your Honor.
15	THE COURT: All right, so where does that take us?
16	THE COURTROOM DEPUTY: To the 31st.
17	THE COURT: March 31st? Okay.
18	All right, so then when we get the amended
19	complaint, then you'll see where I do encourage you to try
20	to settle this, if you can.
21	I mean, the guy clearly was exonerated, spent ten
22	years in jail, so it's worth a shot any way.
23	MR. SOKOLOFF: Your Honor, he the plaintiff has a
24	court of claims action going.
25	THE COURT: Well, that does not mean that he can't

PROCEEL) -

have -- I mean, my view is that maybe people should try to coordinate.

The state legislature should maybe -- there should be some kind of a rule that if you get one you don't get the other, but that's not what the law is, so...

6 MR. SOKOLOFF: I would ask, though, if they're going
7 to amend by March 31st, this -- so --

THE COURT: You're talking about the John Does?

MR. SOKOLOFF: I'm talking about that, but I'm also thinking in terms of discovery.

So if the complaint is going to be switched up --

12 THE COURT: Yes.

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MR. SOKOLOFF: -- I think we should wait to begin discovery until we see which complaint we have.

THE COURT: I think you would agree to that; wouldn't you?

MR. HARVIS: Oh, I don't mind waiting until the end of the month to move forward, but we're going to be appearing before Judge Orenstein at the end of the month anyway, so that would be a good time to discuss the schedule.

THE COURT: Right. I'll talk to him, too. I'll let him know that there's going to be an amendment.

MR. SOKOLOFF: And one of the things we were going to ask is to stay *Monell* discovery.

THE COURT: I don't think anybody's going to start

For the sake of efficiency, if there are people with knowledge, we might be able to work that out.

MR. SOKOLOFF: They have a lot of the documents.

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that case?

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MR. HARVIS: I don't want to speak out of turn. I realize it may be a little bit of a wrinkle. I can found out.

But it was a much lower case than this second degree homicide, and this was as serious a charge as you can get.

THE COURT: So he was probably remanned on the murder.